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IAC-D-57/74  
26 August 1957

Post-Mortem on NIE 100-4-57:

Implications of Growing Nuclear Capabilities for  
the Communist Bloc and the Free World

dated 9 July 1957

I. Findings

1. Since much of NIE 100-4-57 involves judgments concerning the future effects of nuclear developments, it is difficult to assess the extent of intelligence gaps. In response to the post-mortem on NIE 100-5-55: "Implications of Growing Nuclear Capabilities for the Communist Bloc and the Free World" (IAC-D-57/10, 23 August 1955) there has been a continuing growth in both the scope and volume of information available on public and official attitudes toward nuclear problems. A number of US sponsored opinion polls bearing on some aspects of the problem were available and a substantial amount of up-to-date information was obtained from [REDACTED] in response to the specific requirements of NIE 100-4-57. 25X1X

2. However, there is still a need for additional concrete and detailed information on public attitudes and the effects of nuclear developments on government policies in non-Communist states. We have little data on popular views and attitudes within the Bloc and on the effects of nuclear weapons developments on Bloc policies and military programs. At the same time, there is a very broad range of information from diverse sources which needs continued collation and analysis to render it useful in the estimative process.

3. While it would be helpful and desirable to have more detailed information concerning the state of public opinion, we recognize that such data has serious limitations as "evidence" in supporting longer-range estimates of popular reactions and government policies. Public opinion is subject to rapid change; it can be shaped by energetic government leadership, and there is

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no necessary correlation, even in a democratic society, between the popular mood of the moment and the policies which responsible leaders will pursue in support of their concept of the national interests. We have no techniques available in the social science field which make possible accurate forecasts of popular reactions to future developments. The problem of assessing future popular and governmental reactions is particularly difficult in a paper like NIE 100-4-57 where we deal with threats of unprecedented magnitude to personal and national existence. Despite these difficulties, we believe that it is essential to continue efforts to expand and systematize the collection of pertinent materials. Information which would be particularly useful - on both the non-Communist world and the Bloc where pertinent - would be that related to the effects of nuclear developments on:

- (a) attitudes and policies with respect to alliances, and with respect to regional cooperation in development of nuclear capabilities,
- (b) neutralist or isolationist tendencies,
- (c) prospects for employment of and reaction to attempted nuclear "blackmail",
- (d) military organization and strategic concepts (including intentions and capabilities with respect to development of nuclear capabilities -- what types of weapons and delivery systems are being planned or developed),
- (e) popular attitudes and government policies, including propaganda, with respect to testing, possession, production, deployment, and use of nuclear weapons.

## II. Action

1. That collection and analysis of such data be continued on a systematic basis in anticipation of continuing requirements for judgments on the implications of developing nuclear capabilities.
2. That the intelligence community take steps to insure that it has available any pertinent studies of public opinion and human behavior.

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